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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Respondent seeks to sustain the granting of 
swnmary judgment dismissing Appellants' Complaint and 
granting judgment on Respondent's Amended Counterclaim. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On June 17, 1977, the Honorable G. Hal Taylor, 
District Judge, heard arguments on Respondent's Motion for 
Swnmary Judgment. The parties stipulated that there were no 
- ---------------
issues of fact. The case was submitted solely on the legal 
___________.., ? 
issues concerning Appellants' affirmative defense based on 
various provisions of the Utah Motor Vehicle Code. 
Appellants' Complaint was dismissed, judgment was 
entered on Respondent's Amended Counterclaim ordering 
Appellants to surrender possession of the subject travel 
trailer to Respondent or in the alternative, pay a money 
judgment in the amount of $9,201.79 with interest and 
costs. Respondent was awarded attorney's fees in the amount 
of $950.00. 
Pursuant to the Court order, Respondent took 
possession of the travel trailer. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants' Statement of Facts is incomplete and 
inaccurate in some instances. Through the use of inuendo, 
Appellants suggest facts which are nonexistent or not a 
matter of record. For these reasons, Respondent desires to 
set forth a more correct version of the facts. 
It was stipulated in open court during the argument 
on defendant's motion for summary judgment which gave rise 
to this appeal that there were no issues of fact before the 
court. The parties agreed to submit the matter on the 
pleadings, affidavits and exhibits submitted to the lower 
court (R. 97}. 
On or about July 26, 1976, Respondent sold a used 
1973 Air Stream Travel Trailer to Appellants. They took 
possession of the trailer and made payments for the months 
of August, September and October. They ceased making 
payments on the trailer and in December of 1976 filed a 
complaint asking for rescission of the contract on the basis 
that the trailer "is unfit for the implied and warranted 
purposes in that the same cannot be licensed in the state of 
I 
Washington and other unknown states which plaintiffs [Appellant:( 
require licenses in, and, therefore, cannot be used by 
plaintiffs for its designated and intended use." (R. 2, 
69,70,74). Appellants asked for no other relief than 
rescission. 
-3-
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The travel trailer, which is the subject of this 
action, was purchased in 1974 by Respondent from Third Party 
Defendant Motors Insurance Corporation (hereinafter "MIC"). 
The trailer had been stolen sometime prior to 1974 and had 
been recovered by MIC, who received title because it had re-
imbursed its insured for loss of the trailer. MIC submitted 
the trailer to the state of Washington Department of Motor 
Vehicles. The trailer was inspected. Under the direction of 
the Washington Highway Patrol, the trailer was reassigned a 
valid vehicle identification number. All requirements of 
the state of Washington were met for the issuance of title 
and relicensing of the trailer. MIC obtained valid title. 
(R. 76 through 83). 
All motor vehicles, including travel trailers have 
a vehicle identification number (VIN) stamped in several 
locations on the vehicle. The correct VIN for the trailer 
is 131B3Sl849. Apparently, the thieves who stole the unit 
altered a VIN which is located on the door plate of the 
trailer to 131B3S2839. When the state of Washington Highway 
Patrol reattached the correct and original number on the 
right-front draw bar of the trailer, they failed to correct 
the altered serial number on the door plate. (R. 72,76-83) · 
At the time the trailer was sold to Appellants, an 
employee of Respondent incorrectly recorded the altered 
serial number from the door plate on the contract and title 
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documents. When Respondent submitted the title documents to 
the State of Utah, they discovered their error and corrected 
it. (R. 72). 
Although Appellants imply in paragraph 1 of the 
Statement of Facts, page 4, Appellants' brief, that the 
trailer was not licensed, it is an undisputed fact that the 
trailer was validly titled and licensed in the State of Utah 
when purchased. At all times material to this cause of 
action, the trailer has been and at the time of the argument 
on defendant's motion for summary judgment, was licensed and 
titled in the State of Utah. 
The trailer can be licensed in the state of 
Washington or in any other state of the Union. (R. 76). It 
should be emphasized, that the trailer has gone through all 
necessary steps for relicensing and retitling in the state 
in which it was stolen, Washington, and in the state in 
which it was purchased and used, Utah. (R. 72,73,76-83). 
After Appellants purchased, licensed and titled 
the trailer in Utah, they took the vehicle to the state of 
Washington. Initially, the state of Washington refused to 
title the vehicle. It is assumed the vehicle inspector saw 
the altered serial number on the door plate and failed to 
check for the correct number. Appellants contacted Responden 
Respondent contacted the state of Washington which apologized 
for its error and requested Appellants to resubmit the 
-5-
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trailer for licensing. Respondent contacted Appellants and 
told them that Washington state would issue title and 
license for the trailer. Appellants never attempted to 
license the trailer in Washington after Respondent contacted 
them. (R. 84-86). 
Subsequent to the sale of the trailer, Respondent 
negotiated the contract of purchase to Zions First National 
Bank. Contrary to the terms of the agreement, Appellants 
failed to make the payments due under the contract. (R. 69, 
72,74,75). 
In April of 1977, Zions First National Bank 
assigned the contract back to Respondent and received 
$9,211.79 as a pay off on the loan for the underlying 
transaction. (Ex. 1, 7 4, 7 5) • 
Appellant makes a major misstatement of the facts 
in paragraph 2, page 4, of the Statement of Facts. Appellants' 
brief states: 
In addition to the above facts, the uncon-
troverted admissions and interrogatories indicated: 
2. That the Travel Trailer was not 
insurable (R. 85). 
There is no statement in the record including page 
85 which supports the statement that the trailer was un-
insurable. On page 85 of the Record, it states: 
Request No. 2. Admit that the travel trailer 
which is the subject matter of plaintiff's Complaint 
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was insured under an insurance policy with Carava 
I . d 1 . h nner Insurance, nc., sai po icy ad an expiration 
date of June 5, 1977. 
(a) : Denied. 
There is no statement on this page or on any other 
page of the Record which indicates that the trailer was 
uninsurable. In fact, Appellants' counsel knows that this 
is not the case. At the argument on the Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Respondent's counsel produced a sworn affidavit 
from Caravanners Insurance, Inc., which stated that the 
travel trailer which is the subject matter of this action 
was currently insured with said company, and that said 
company knew of no reason why the trailer could not continue 
to be insured with the company. Through inadvertence, the 
affidavit was not formally submitted to the court and, 
therefore, is not a part of the record. However, Appellants' 
counsel had the opportunity to review the affidavit and was 
aware of its contents. 
Appellants' Statement of Facts implies that 
Respondent altered the serial number on the subject travel 
trailer. Such is not the case. The serial number was 
altered by those who stole the trailer. The state of 
Washington Highway Patrol failed to remove the ~ltered 
number when it was retitled and when the correct VIN was 
replaced on the unit. Brasher's incorrectly recorded the 
altered number on the sales documents. That error was 
quickly rectified. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE IS NO VIOLATION OF UTAH LAW WHICH WOULD RESULT IN 
APPELLANTS' RECEIVING RESPONDENT'S TRAVEL TRAILER WITHOUT AN 
OBLIGATION TO PAY FOR IT. 
Introduction 
Appellants seek, by a tortured application of 41-
3-3, UCA (1953), as amended, to be able to obtain Respondent's ~ 
\'· ~"' i travel trailer worth in excess of $10,000.00 with no obligation« ~ 
,/v;/,l 
to pay for it! f> J ,,.• 
Quite simply, Appellants suggest that Respondent o-fF. 1;.• 
.. " 
violated 41-1-18, 41-1-120 and 41-20-1, which are included ·!""~ 
within the scope of 41-3-3 by virtue of 41-3-23(a) (4) set 
forth below. 
A. There Have Been No Violations of Utah Law. 
41-3-3 UCA (1953), as amended, provides: 
Penalties for violation of act.-- No action or 
right of action to recover any such motor vehicle, 
or any part of the selling price thereof, shall be 
maintained in the courts of this state by any such 
dealer or vendor, his successors or assigns, in 
any case wherein such vendor or dealer shall have 
failed to comply with the terms and provisions of 
this act, and such vendor or dealer, upon conviction 
for the violation of any of the provisions of this 
act shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and 
shall be punished by a fine of not more than $299 
or by imprisonment for not more than six months in 
the county jail, or by both such fine and im-
prisonment. 
Sections 41-1-18, 41-1-120, and 41-20-1 respectively 
provide as follows: 
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41-1-18. Registration and certificates of title--
Unlawful to violate provisions requiring.-- It 
shall be unlawful for any person to drive or move 
or for an owner knowingly to permit to be driven 
or moved upon any highway any vehicle of a type 
required to be registered hereunder which is not 
registered or for which a certificate of title has 
not been issued or applied for, or for which the 
appropriate fee has not been paid when and as 
required hereunder, except that when application 
accompanied by proper fee has been made for 
registration and certificate of title for a 
vehicle it may be operated temporarily pending 
complete registration upon displaying a temporary 
permit duly verified, or other evidence of such 
application, or otherwise under rules and regulations 
promulgated by the commission. 
41-1-120. Selling or buying vehicles without 
manufacturers' numbers a felony. -- Any person who 
knowingly buys, receives, disposes of, sells, 
offers for sale or has in his possession any motor 
vehicle or engine removed from a motor vehicle, 
from which the manufacturer's serial or engine 
number or other distinguishing number or identificatl! 
mark or number placed thereon under assignment 
from the department has been removed, defaced, 
covered, altered or destroyed for the purpose of 
concealing or misrepresenting the identify of said 
motor vehicle or engine, is guilty of a felony. 
41-20-1. Definitions.-- As used in this act: 
(1) The words "American Standard" mean a 
standard adopted and published by the American 
National Standards Institute or the National Fiu 
Protection Association. 
(2) The words "mobile home" mean a vehicular, 
portable structure built on a chassis and designed 
to be used without a permanent foundation as a 
dwelling when connected to indicated utilites. 
(3) The words "travel trailer" mean a 
vehicular, portable unit, mounted on wheels, not 
requiring special highway movement permits when 
drawn by a motorized vehicle: 
(a) Designed as a temporary dwelling 
-9-
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for travel, recreational and vacation use; 
and 
(b) 
having a 
feet and 
feet. 
When factory-equipped for the road, 
body width· of not more than eight 
a body length of not more than forty 
(4) The words "motor home" mean a self-pro-
pelled vehicular unit, primarily designed as a 
temporary dwelling for travel, recreational and 
vacation use. 
(5) The words "recreational vehicle" mean a 
vehicular unit, other than a mobile home, primarily 
designed as a temporary dwelling for travel, 
recreational and vacation use, which is either 
self-propelled or is mounted on or pulled by 
another vehicle, including but not limited to: a 
travel trailer, a camping trailer, a truck camper, 
and a motor home. 
(6) The word "person" includes any individual, 
firm, partnership, corporation, or other legal 
entity. 
Appellant argues that 41-1-18, 41-1-120 and 41-20-
1 are included within the proscription of 41-3-3 by 41-3-
23(a)(4) which states: 
41-3-23. Prohibited acts or omissions--Violation 
by licensee.--(a) It shall be unlawful and a 
violation of this act for the holder of any 
license issued under the terms and provisions 
hereof: 
(4) To violate any law of the state of Utah 
now existing or hereafter enacted respecting 
commerce in motor vehicles or any lawful rule or 
regulation respecting commerce in motor vehicles 
promulgated by any licensing or regulating authority 
now existing or hereafter created by the laws of 
the state of Utah. 
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Respondent did not violate 41-1-18 UCA (1953), as 
amended. That statute makes it unlawful for "any person to 
drive or move or for an owner knowingly to permit to be 
driven or moved upon any highway (any vehicle requiring 
registration]." [emphasis supplied]. There is no evidence 
before this court that Respondent drove or moved the travel 
trailer on the highway. As a matter of fact, it did not. 
Respondent was not the owner of the trailer--Appellant was. 
Hence, the statute has no application. There is no evidence 
that the travel trailer was ever moved on the highway when 
it was unregistered. The only evidence before this court is 
that the travel trailer was properly titled and licensed in 
the state of Utah in the course of purchase and that during 
the litigation it was relicensed in the state of Utah. 
The only evidence of any registration problem in 
Utah is that Respondent make a clerical error and recorded 
the wrong identification number on the contract and title 
documents. This error was discovered, corrected and title 
and license was issued. Even if there were a violatio~, 
certainly, there was no knowing violation, as required by 
the statute. 
Respondent did not violate 41-1-120 UCA (1953), u 
amended. This section says that a violation requires a 
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person knowingly buy, receive, dispose or sell a motor 
vehicle or engine from a motor vehicle, from which the 
manufacturer's serial engine number or identification number 
has been removed, defaced, covered, altered or destroyed 
"for the purpose of concealing or misrepresenting the 
identify of said motor vehicle " [emphasis supplied] is 
guilty of a felony. 
Although for some purposes of the code a travel 
trailer is a "motor vehicle," for this section of the code, 
a travel trailer is not a "motor vehicle." A "motor vehicle" 
is defined for the purposes of Chapter 1 in 41-1-l(b). It 
states: 
(b) "Motor Vehicle." Every vehicle which is 
self-propelled and every vehicle which is propelled 
by electric power obtained from overhead trolley 
wire, but not operated upon rails. 
A trailer is defined as follows: 
(g) "Trailer." Every vehicle without motive 
power designed for carrying persons or property 
and for being drawn by a motor vehicle and so 
constructed that no part of its weight rests upon 
the towing vehicle. 
Clearly, a travel trailer is not a motor vehicle 
within the meaning of Chapter 1. 
Assuming for purposes of argument that a travel 
trailer is a motor vehicle within the purview of Chapter 1, 
it requires a knowing violation for the purpose of concealing 
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or misrepresenting the identity of the motor vehicle. There 
is no evidence whatsoever that Respondent was guilty of any 
such conduct. 
There is no violation of 41-20-1 UCA (1953), as 
amended. This section is merely a definitional section. It 
contains no affirmative duties. 
Appellant on page 8 of its brief, argues that the 
travel trailer did not have an inscription on the trailer 
permanently identifying the trailer as a travel trailer. 
There is no evidence to support this contention in the 
record. More importantly, that requirement of 41-20-1 was 
removed from the statute by the 1971 amendment and is no 
longer contained therein. 
B. 41-3-3 Must Be Construed So As Not To Lead To An Absurd 
and Unjust Result. 
Assuming, arguendo, that there is some type of 
technical violation of the act by Respondent, it would be an 
absurd and unjust result which would grant to the plaintiff 
the huge windfall of receiving a travel trailer without 
having to pay for it. Surely, the legislature, in passing 
41-3-3, did not intend to encourage those buying travel 
trailers to cease payments thereon in hope that some technica: 
violation would give them the travel trailer free of all 
encumbrances. 
-13-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In Rowley~ Public Service Commission, et al., 
112 U 116, 185 P. 2d 514 (1947), the appellant was arguing 
for what would have been an absurd or unjust interpretation 
of the statute dealing with the regulation of contract 
carriers. The appellant argued that the literal inter-
pretation of the various laws regulating contract carriers 
would mean that his rights would have been preserved under 
the grandfather provision of the applicable acts, even 
though he was in violation of the law during the grandfather 
period. This Court recognized that such an intention could 
not rationally be found in the statute and stated: 
[W]hen the legislative intent is not clear and 
certain, and a literal interpretation of the 
language of the statute gives an absurd result, 
then the court is justified in searching the 
enactment for further indication of legislative 
intent. These indications can be determined by 
the wording of the act or by considering the 
underlying reasons •.• and the purposes to be 
accomplished. 185 P. 2d at 520. [This language 
was approved in Anderson ~ Utah County, 368 P. 2d 
912 (1962)] 
In light of the history of amendment and change of 
41-3-1, et seq. and in light of the shocking results which 
would attach to this case if appellant were allowed to apply 
this section as argued, this court has a duty to interpret 
that section to avoid such an unjust result. As is stated in 
73 Am Jur 2d Statutes, §265: 
A statute subject to interpretation is presumed 
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not to have been intended to produce absurd 
consequences, but to have the most reasonable 
operation that its language permits. If possible 
doubtful provisions should be given a reasonable ' 
rational, sensible, and intelligent construction'. 
These rules prevail where they are not restrained 
by the clear language of the statute. Under this 
rule, general terms in a statute should be so 
limited in their application as not to lead to 
absurd consequences. 
Thus, in interpreting §41-3-3, the initial question 
must be to what motor vehicles does this section refer when 
it says "any such motor vehicle." The word "any" may be 
given a restrictive interpretation while the word "such" 
should be given the effect called for in its context. 
Sections 41-3-1 through 41-3-5, as originally 
enacted in 1937, constituted a separate act having the 
following stated statutory purpose: 
An Act to Regulate the Business of Selling Used 
Motor Vehicles by Dealers Not Residing in or 
Having a Permanent Place of Business in the State 
of Utah, and by Resident Dealers Purchasing, 
Handling and Selling Used Motor Vehicles Received 
or Acquired From Nonresident Dealers; Requiring 
All Used Cars Brought Into the State for the 
Purpose of Sale to Be Registered With the State 
Tax Commission, All Such Dealers to Execute and 
Deliver to Each Purchaser of a Used Motor Vehicle 
a Bond Indemnifying the Purchaser Against Failure 
of Title or Breach of Warranty or Fraudulent . 
Misrepresentations, and the Delivery of a Certif1ca' 
of Title to the Vendee; Defining Terms, and 
Providing Penalties for the Violation of the 
Provisions of This Act. Laws of Utah, Chapter 69, 
1937. 
The act in using the phrase "any such motor 
vehicle," referred only to those motor vehicles mentioned ir. 
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41-3-1 [which is now repealed] , dealing only with non-
resident dealers and the requirement to register motor 
vehicles transferred into the state within ten days and 
posting a bond thereon, and 41-3-2 [which is currently in 
effect) dealing with the requirement to deliver title to a 
vendee of a used motor vehicle within forty-eight hours. 
Id. 
Chapter 3 of Title 41 has subsequently been 
expanded through amendment, but an analysis of what has been 
added, makes it clear that ~he remedy provided by §41-3-3 
was not meant to apply to the additions. §§41-3-6 through 
41-3-27 were added in 1949. These sections deal with definitions, 
provide for an administrator and an advisory board to 
administer and enforce the act, define procedural matters, 
stipulate types of licenses that dealers and salesmen can 
obtain, state the required fees to obtain the licenses and 
how the fees are to be used, explain the requirements for 
filing bonds, and detail the administrator's hearings and 
the effect thereof. Only §41-3-23, "Prohibited Acts or 
Omissions" refers to motor vehicles in a context which might 
be applicable to 41-3-3. 
For example, 41-3-23(3) makes it unlawful for a 
licensee to knowingly purchase, sell, transport or otherwise 
handle stolen motor vehicles. §41-3-23(4), which is relied 
upon by Appellant, makes it unlawful to violate any law 
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dealing with conunerce in motor vehicles. §41-3-23(a) deals 
with restricting licensees from dismanteling a motor vehicle 
without a permit. The whole context of 41-3-23 deals with 
prohibited acts of licensees. The subject matter is not 
motor vehicles, but licensees. Thus, applying the reference 
of nany such motor vehicle" in 41-3-3 to 41-3-23 ,wherein the 
subject matter is not motor vehicles, but licensees, is 
tenuous at best. 
In addition, the act added in 1949 provided its 
own penalty provision. §41-3-27 describes the penalty for 
violations of this act [meaning 41-3-6 through 41-3-27). 
The terminology used in 41-3-27 in many ways is redundant to 
the penalties imposed by 41-3-3. No mention is made in 41-
3-27 of a bar to recovery of a "motor vehicle" because,as 
mentioned above, motor vehicles were not the subject matter 
of the 1949 addition. 
While one could argue that losing a right to 
recover a motor vehicle is a "penalty" to a dealer, such a 
penalty does not comport with the nature of the other 
penalties imposed (misdemeanor), nor with the general public 
policy of not allowing one to benefit from his own wrongdoinc 
as it applies to the facts of this case. Hence, the additioc 
of 41-3-27 apparently evidences a legislative intent to 
retain the effect of the penalty of 41-3-3 as applying only 
to the 1937 act, while the penalty of 41-3-27 was added to 
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-apply to the 1947 act. 
§§41-3-28 through 41-3-37 were added to Chapter 3 
of Title 41 in 1953 and likewise do not discuss "motor 
vehicles" in the context where the reference from 41-3-3-
("any such motor vehicle") would be applicable. These 
sections deal with allowing temporary permits and special 
plates, not with motor vehicles per se. In conclusion, the 
phrase "any such motor vehicle" as is used in 41-3-3 must 
refer only to those motor vehicles described in the original 
1937 act. 
In any event, the legislature could not have 
intended that 41-3-3 would apply to a dealer who had in good 
faith complied with the law in all respects, but because of 
a clerical error, might have been guilty of a technical 
violation. 
C. 41-3-3 Is Not Applicable to Resident Dealers. 
This court held in Clearfield State Bank ~ Peters 
Plumbing, 10 u 2d 136, 349 P. 2d 618 (1960), that §41-3-3 
was only applicable to non-resident dealers. Respondent is 
a Utah corporation duly qualified and doing business in the 
state of Utah and, hence, is a resident dealer. 
In Clearfield, supra, "A" sold a car to "B," but 
kept title until "B" paid for it. "P," a bank, handled the 
draft for the transaction. "B," a used car dealer, sold the 
car on time to "D." "B" then assigned the security agreement 
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and note received from 11 0" to the same bank, 11 P. 11 "B 11 never 
paid 11 A11 for the car, so "A 11 kept the title. The purchaser, 
11 0," upon learning that 11A11 had the title, refused to make 
payments to "B, 11 and made them to 11A," eventually receiving 
the title. 11 P" brought suit against "D 11 to recover the car. 
The Utah Supreme Court held that 11 P 11 was not barred from 
bringing suit by §§41-3-2 and 41-3-3 as "D" asserted, 
because those sections applied only to non-residents. 
Appellants argue in their brief that Clearfield 
has been overruled because 41-3-l was repealed by the 1967 
legislature. He cites no legislative history or authority 
for this proposition, and the restrictive application as set 
forth in Clearfield still applies to the remaining portions 
of the statute. From the title of the act, supra, page 
15, it is clear that it was intended to apply to non-residenc 
dealers. Absent some specific showing, there is no basis to 
assume as Appellant has that by repealing Section l, the 
legislature has overruled Clearfield. 
POINT II 
APPELLANTS MADE NO SHOWING TO SUBSTANTIATE A CAUSE OF ACTIO:; 
FOR RESCISSION. 
Appellants' Complaint was narrowly drawn to ask 
the court for the remedy of rescission. There is no cause 
of action stated for damages or for any other type of 
relief. It is so well supported so as not to need recitatiC 
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of authority that rescission, as an equitable remedy, will 
only lie when the party requesting rescission has an inadequate 
remedy at law. 
Appellants have made no such showing. In fact, 
the record is totally devoid of any basis for rescission at 
all. Assuming all interpretations of the facts in favor of 
Appellants, all they have shown is that there was a clerical 
error made on the sales documents, and upon initial presentation 
of the trailer to the Washington state authorities, they 
refused to license it. It is undisputed,.that the trailer 
was licensed and is licensed in the state of Utah and that 
it can be licensed in the state of Washington. If Appellants 
have suffered anything, they have suffered a minor inconvenience, 
which was remedied promptly by the Respopdent. Surely, these 
facts do not constitute sufficient grounds to invoke the 
court of equity to grant the drastic remedy of rescission. 
Thus, the trial court was imminently correct in dismissing 
plaintiffs' Complaint. 
CONCLUSION 
What Appellants seek to have this court do is 
create an enormously unjust result. They seek to have this 
court award them an expensive travel trailer with no ob-
ligation to pay for it. Respondent has done everything in 
its power to comply in good faith with the laws of the state 
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of Utah. Its compliance is evidenced by the fact that the 
travel trailer has been licensed and titled in this state 
and can be licensed in the state of Washington. Respondent 
has violated no law. Appellants have shown no grounds for 
the relief they are requesting. 
The decision of the lower court should be affirmed 
because (1) Respondent has not violated any Utah law which 
would bring §41-3-3 into operation; (2) Even if Respondent 
were guilty of a technical violation of 41-3-3, the statute 
must be construed so as not to lead to an absurd and unjust 
result; (3) This court has held that 41-3-3 does not apply 
to resident dealers; and (4) Appellants' proof is woefully 
inadequate to justify the granting of the equitable remedy 
of rescission. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ~ay of February, lf 
J~/ 
Jeffrey N. lclayton, of 
MOYLE & DRAPER 
600 Deseret Plaza 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that I hand delivered true 
and correct copies of Respondent's Brief to Robert M. McRae 
and Robert J. Haws, Attorneys for Appellants, 370 East Fifth 
south, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; and to Alan D. Frandsen, 
Attorney for defendant Motors Insurance, 353 East Fourth 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this /J;..IA.-day of 
February, 1978. 
~/ 
I 
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